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Hate Thy Neighbor: Violent Racial Exclusion and the
Persistence of Segregation
Jeannine Bell ∗
This Article addresses one of the consequences of racial segregation in
housing—violence and intimidation directed at minorities who are integrating
white neighborhoods. In describing the history and dynamics of this type of antiintegrationist crime, the Article seeks to offer an introduction to the setting of hate
crimes in a neighborhood context. The Article provides a critical bridge between
hate crime law and housing law, exploring the substantial difficulties when each of
these legal remedies is used to combat this type of violence. The Article concludes
by offering a series of solutions uniquely crafted to combat the problem of biasmotivated violence in the neighborhood context.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The night after a Black family moved into their new house in a predominately
Italian neighborhood, a mob of roughly one thousand whites, who had been rioting
in a nearby park, surrounded the family’s house and began to throw stones,
breaking the windows. 2 The following evening, two hundred teenagers gathered
close to the family’s home shouting, “We want blood.” 3
Soon after Mattie Harrell and her family moved to a new neighborhood in
Vineland, New Jersey, a man fired four rounds from a .22-caliber gun at the
house. 4 The first bullet pierced the wall near Harrell’s 8-year-old son’s bed. 5 The
perpetrator, a white man, later told police that he had fired at the house because he
wanted to let Ms. Harrell and her family, the first African-Americans to move to
the neighborhood, know that they were not wanted. 6 The Harrells stayed, but
several years after the incident they were still the only African-American family
living in the neighborhood. 7
What can be made of these two incidents? Though they are similar in that
they both involve Blacks who have moved into all-white neighborhoods, what is
perhaps most interesting about them is that nearly forty years separate the two
incidents. The first occurred in the late 1950s, the second in 1994. Though
assumed by many to be a relic of this country’s long-dead history, violence
directed at racial and ethnic minorities who have moved to white neighborhoods is
not uncommon. In fact, scenarios like the ones described above are so common
that scholars have coined a term, “move-in violence,” to describe acts of violence
2
For a discussion of this and other incidents of anti-integrationist violence in Chicago
occurring in the late 1950s, see Amanda Seligman, BLOCK BY BLOCK: NEIGHBORHOODS AND PUBLIC
POLICY ON CHICAGO’S WEST SIDE 167 (2005).
3
Id.
4
See Maria Newman, Victim of Hate Crime Calls High Court Ruling a ‘Slap in the Face.’,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at B5. Five incidents of gunshots against the Harrell’s house were
eventually attributed to Charles Apprendi, a pharmacist living about a mile away on the same street.
After Mr. Apprendi was convicted under New Jersey’s hate crime law and sentenced to 12 years in
prison, the Supreme Court struck down a part of New Jersey’s penalty enhancement law on the
grounds that the question of Mr. Apprendi’s bias motivation was a question of fact that needed to be
submitted to the jury. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2001). Ms. Harrell called the
Supreme Court ruling “a slap in the face.” Newman, supra, at B5.
5
Newman, supra note 4, at B5.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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and intimidation directed at racial and ethic minorities integrating white
neighborhoods. 8
Incidents like those described above are not what we traditionally think of as
bias-motivated violence or “hate crimes”—crimes motivated by prejudice on the
basis of race, religion, or sexual orientation. Nevertheless they clearly fit into the
paradigm created for this type of act—particularly when motivated by racial
prejudice. In conforming to this picture, such incidents represent a new and
compelling frontier in this recently created category of crime. This Article
describes the new frontier in bias-motivated violence and argues that move-in
violence constitutes a not yet considered justification for the category of biasmotivated crime.
In Part II of the Article, the history and dynamics of move-in violence are
analyzed. In this section, I provide a brief history of move-in violence and offer an
introduction to the setting for hate crimes in the neighborhood context. In Part III,
I analyze the legal landscapes—hate crimes law, federal civil rights law, and fair
housing law—the host of contemporary prohibitions aimed at neighborhood-based
hate crimes. This section also explores the myriad difficulties created when each
of these legal remedies is used to combat violence in this particular context. In
Part IV, I explore the possible link between hate crime and housing segregation,
suggesting that move-in violence and its consequences may offer a previously
unexplored justification for hate crime legislation as a whole. In Part V, I offer
suggestions for addressing move-in violence, and, as a result the problem of
segregation.
II. HATE CRIMES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT
Actions directed at families like the Harrells seem weirdly anachronistic for
several reasons. The latest Census data shows, for example, that racial and ethnic
minorities comprise an increasingly large portion of the U.S. population. 9
Increasing racial and ethnic diversity has also been met with increases in tolerance,
survey research reveals. 10 Despite these gains, there are widening gaps in the
housing experiences of people of color and whites, which lead to spaces ripe for
move-in violence.
One of the most commonly understood justifications for the creation of these
white neighborhood spaces is the phenomenon of “white flight,” where large
numbers of middle and upper class white people flee neighborhoods in search of
8
JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITT, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND
BLOODSHED 246 (1993).
9
THE LEWIS MUMFORD CENTER, ETHNIC DIVERSITY GROWS, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION
LAGS BEHIND (2001), http://mumford.albany.edu/census/WholePop/WPreport/page1.html.
10
See, e.g,. HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA, TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 74–75 (1985) (depicting public opinion data showing increasing white support for
racial intermarriage and school integration).
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new spaces that are predominately white. “White flight,” 11 has occurred in large
cities across the country when minorities, particularly African-Americans seeking
better housing, moved to white neighborhoods. 12 Not all whites who were
reluctant to live near minorities immediately moved elsewhere when minorities
moved in; some individuals made the decision to stand and fight. Confronted with
their neighborhood’s changing racial dynamics, whites in such neighborhoods
“blocked the penetration as if defending against a foreign enemy, using any means
at their disposal to deter the migration.” 13
In this Article, I argue that the problem of violence directed at minorities in
white neighborhoods extends beyond the weeks immediately following their move
to a new neighborhood. The scope of violence directed at minorities particularly
over the past twenty years includes acts of violence, threats and harassment that
have been specifically aimed at forcing out Blacks, Asian, Latino and MiddleEastern residents who are not necessarily newcomers out of the predominately
white neighborhoods to which they have moved. I lump such violence, along with
move-in violence, under the broad category “anti-integrationist violence.”
A. Minority Integration from the African-American Great Migration until the Fair
Housing Act
African-American populations in northern cities exploded after the Great
Migration of Southern Blacks. In New York, for instance, between 1890 and
1910, more than 60,000 Blacks moved to New York City, tripling the number of
Black residents. 14 During the same time, Philadelphia’s Black community grew by
more than two and one half times, reaching roughly 200,000 people, or 11% of the
population. 15 The sudden influx of African-Americans was also greatly felt in
Chicago, which by 1930 had the second-largest Black population of any city in the
United States. 16
The increase in the number of African-Americans put great pressure on the
tiny number of neighborhoods to which minorities were relegated. The earliest
11

Research on “white flight” suggests that this phenomenon was exacerbated by
unscrupulous “blockbusters”—real estate speculators intent on exploiting the “deep-seated fears of
white homeowners who dreaded Black encroachment on their turf”—for profit. See, e.g., THOMAS J.
SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF URBAN CRISIS, RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 195 (1996).
12
People of color who are victims of move-in violence were often motivated to move to a
white neighborhood to improve their life chances. Research has suggested that benefits accrue to
individuals who move out of poor neighborhoods. See Kathleen C. Engel, Moving up the Residential
Hierarchy: A New Remedy for Old Injury or Arising from Housing Discrimination, 77 WASH. U. L.
Q. 1152, 1153–58 (1999).
13
STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT DOOR: SEGREGATION AND
RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 6 (2000).
14
Id. at 16.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 32.
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efforts at violent resistance to minority move-ins came as whites resisted attempts
by African-Americans to move out of overcrowded, “Black Belts” in large cities in
the Midwest and Northeast.
Resistance to such moves by African-Americans, which began in the 1920s,
took a variety of forms. Large conflicts like housing riots in Chicago in 1919 and
1966, Detroit in 1942, 17 and Cicero, Illinois in 1951, are well documented. 18
White hostility was of paramount importance in determining where Blacks lived;
white animosity—often in the form of violence—restricted Blacks’ housing
choices. 19 For instance, in Detroit in 1942, when city and federal officials
designated the Sojourner Truth housing project for Black war workers, white
residents from the area ignited in protest. 20 When the first Black family moved in,
Black supporters and their white opponents clashed—at least 40 were injured, and
220 were arrested. 21
Though in this early era of widespread minority integration organized civil
disorder was a powerful weapon used by white opponents of minority integration,
individualized threats directed at minority homeowners were also used. Such
resistance against African-American integration occurred as “thousands of small
acts of terrorism.” 22 Newcomers suffered harassment in the form of broken
windows, anonymous threats, fire bombings and other types of vandalism designed
to drive them out. 23 The experience of the Wilsons, who bought a home in a white
neighborhood on Detroit’s northeast side in 1955, serves as a representative case in
point. 24 Soon after the Wilsons closed on their house, angry white neighbors
targeted the family as part of a five-month siege of harassment. 25 Just before they
moved in, a vandal broke into the house, turned on all the faucets, and blocked the
kitchen sink, flooding the basement. 26 Black paint was splashed on the walls and
floors. 27 After the Wilsons had cleaned up the mess and left, someone broke all
the front windows in the house. 28 A few weeks later someone threw a stone
through the bathroom window. 29 Over the course of the next several months,
17

SUGRUE, supra note 11, at 73–74.
See MEYER, supra note 13, at 6.
19
ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO 19401960 (1983).
20
SUGRUE, supra note 11, at 73.
21
Id. at 74.
22
MEYER, supra note 13, at 6.
23
Id. at 59.
24
SUGRUE, supra note 11, at 232–33.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
SUGRUE, supra note 11, at 232–33.
18
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individuals threw eggs, rocks and bricks at the Wilsons’ windows, threw paint at
the front of house, and even put snakes in the basement. 30 The attacks continued
until the Wilsons moved out. 31
The violence of the type and intensity as that leveled at the Wilsons was by no
means unusual in the period between World War II and the 1960s. In Detroit,
Chicago, St. Louis, Boston, and many other cities in the Midwest and Northeast,
white residents motivated by a mixture of fear, anger, and desperation violently
resisted African-American moves into their neighborhoods. 32
B. Move-in Violence after the Passage of the Fair Housing Act
Prior to the 1960s, move-in violence was the most visible of several
mechanisms aimed at preventing minority integration. In response, civil rights
organizations including the NAACP mounted a campaign against a variety of legal
and extralegal barriers to open housing—racial covenants, 33 race-based zoning
practices, housing discrimination, and real estate brokers’ racialized steering
practices. 34 These campaigns resulted in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 35 which
broadly outlaws discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, color, and
religion in the sale, rental, and occupancy of housing.
The passage of fair housing legislation did not end the extralegal violence
directed at minorities who had moved to white neighborhoods. In cities across the
country violence continued to occur on the color line. One of the most publicized
incidents of anti-integrationist violence since the passage of the Fair Housing Act
occurred in the Boston area in 1976, when Otis and Alva Debnam, the first Blacks
to purchase a home in their Irish neighborhood, were confronted by white
neighbors who mounted a campaign of racial intimidation, violence, and vandalism
against them. 36 Similarly, a full decade later in Chicago, of the 1,129 hate crimes
reported between 1985 and 1990, half were located in neighborhoods undergoing
racial change. 37
30

Id.
Id.
32
See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Crimes Without Punishment: White Neighbors’
Resistance to Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 416–20 (2002) (documenting
individual acts of move-in violence between 1910 and 1959). See generally MEYER, supra note 7;
SUGRUE, supra note 5; REYNOLDS FARLEY ET AL., DETROIT DIVIDED (2000); HIRSCH, supra note 19.
33
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the enforcement of racial covenants,
private agreements limiting the sale, lease or occupancy of housing to members of a particular race
violated the 14th Amendment).
34
Meyer, supra note 13, at 22–29.
35
The Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-19, 3613 (1968)).
36
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION IN THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 91 (1993).
37
Id. at 90.
31
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Research on move-in violence has suggested that the experiences of families
like the Debnams are not just anecdotal. 38 A special report published in 1987 by
the Klanwatch Project of the Southern Poverty Law Center documented 45 cases
of arsons and cross burnings directed at minorities who had moved to mostly white
neighborhoods in cities and suburban area in the mid-to late 1980s. 39 In addition
to the cross burnings and arson, the report documented hundreds of acts of
vandalism and intimidation (i.e., threatening phone calls and letters) directed at
preserving housing segregation. 40
Besides describing the character of the violence, the Klanwatch report noted
several other important hallmarks of the violence. First, only a minority of these
neighborhood-based hate crimes were committed by avowed white supremacists.
According to the report, in cases where the perpetrators could be identified, “the
perpetrators of these attacks are rarely found to be card carrying racists.” 41 The
report also highlighted the broad geographic diversity of move-in violence, finding
it as prevalent in the North, Midwest and the West as in the South. “Since 1985 a
majority of the 45 known arsons and cross burning attempts against move-ins have
taken place in metropolitan areas of the North and Midwest.” 42 The report noted
that the only death associated with move-in violence—a 66-year-old Black woman
who died as a result of the arson of her home—occurred specifically in the
Midwest, in Cleveland. 43
Other research on move-in violence has also highlighted the importance of
shifting one’s focus away from the South, which has been traditionally associated
with racial violence. In fact, there have been several studies of neighborhoods in
New York City in the 1980s and 1990s, which describe the violent resistance
mounted by whites to Blacks moving into white neighborhoods.44 One of the most
detailed studies of bias-motivated crime in the 1980s and 1990s suggested that
white resistance to minority incursions in New York City was not limited to

38

See, e.g., JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED (2004) (documenting move-in violence
directed at minorities moving to white neighborhoods in “Center City.”); LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ &
JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE
SUBURBIA CHICAGO (2000); Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 32, at 401–09 (describing acts of movein violence directed at minorities in Chicago, Vidor, Texas, and Boston in the 1980s and 1990s).
39
See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, MOVE-IN VIOLENCE: WHITE RESISTANCE TO
NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION IN THE 1980S (1987).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 2.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 3.
44
See, e.g., Howard Pinderhughes, The Anatomy of Racially Motivated Violence in New York
City: A Case Study of Youth in Southern Brooklyn, 40 SOC. PROBS. 478 (1993); JONATHAN REESER,
CANARSIE: THE JEWS AND ITALIANS OF BROOKLYN AGAINST LIBERALISM (1985); Donald P. Green et
al., Defended Neighborhoods, Integration and Racially Motivated Crime, 104 AM. J. SOC. 372
(1998).
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African-Americans moving in. 45 This study, focused on neighborhoods in New
York City, found that increases in anti-Black, anti-Latino, and anti-Asian crime
followed the movement of Blacks, Latinos and Asians into white neighborhoods. 46
In that study, the largest proportion of anti-minority hate crimes in the city were
committed in the white neighborhoods to which minorities were moving. 47 While
a precise motive for this behavior was beyond the scope of their research, the
study’s authors hypothesized that racism, nostalgia, and perceived self-interest, in
conjunction with “exclusionary sentiment and tacit support (or active
encouragement) of neighbors leads to a heightened propensity for action when
racial homogeneity is threatened.” 48
Contemporary incidents of anti-integrationist violence have their roots in a
sordid history of attempts to prevent minority integration of white neighborhoods.
Though the earliest years of the minority integration were peaceful, in the 1920s
with the onset of the great African-American Migration, the presence of AfricanAmericans and sometimes other minorities became much more controversial.
Right after the Great Migration, from the 1920s through the passage of the Fair
Housing Act, violent resistance to African-Americans moving to white
neighborhoods in the North and Midwest was organized and often, but not always,
involved mob violence. 49 Since the passage of the Fair Housing Act, such
violence has decreased and also changed its format. Demonstrations involving
hundreds of neighbors have been replaced by a barrage of small acts directed at
families in their new homes—slashed tires, burnt crosses, broken windows, and
racial slurs. Frequently, in response to this “death by a thousand cuts,” the family
gets the message and leaves the neighborhood.
III. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR MOVE-IN VIOLENCE
One is entirely free not to like one’s neighbors. However, committing a crime
against a newcomer because you do not like people of their race living in your
neighborhood is sanctioned by the general criminal law and may also violate state
and federal fair housing and/or civil rights law, and state or local hate crime
statutes, which often prohibit violence on the basis of race, religion or sexual
orientation. The various remedies, federal and state, are described below.

45

Green et al., supra note 44, at 397.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
MEYER, supra note 13, at 6 (describing racial conflict over Blacks moving to white
neighborhoods was expressed both in the form of riots and as “small acts of terrorism”).
46
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A. Federal Remedies for Anti-integrationist Violence
1. Civil Rights Actions
Violence directed at individuals pursuing their rights to housing comprises the
majority of cases of racial violence prosecuted by the Department of Justice. 50
The most common federal civil rights statutes that may be used to prosecute antiintegrationist violence are found in § 241 of U.S. Code Title 18. 51 Section 241,
passed during Reconstruction after the Civil War, punishes conspiracies to “injure,
oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, or
Commonwealth, Possession or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of” rights
protected under the U.S. Constitution and federal law. 52
In hate crime cases prosecuted under § 241, the prosecution must demonstrate
that the victim was engaging in a federally protected right with which the
perpetrators interfered. 53 This may be challenging in some hate crime cases, 54 but
not in those involving anti-integrationist violence because such incidents are
directed at individuals in and around their homes. When § 241 is used to punish
anti-integrationist violence, the federally protected activities include one’s right to
use property or housing under Title 42 of the U.S. Code. (“Property Rights of
Citizens”). 55 Title 42 mandates that “all citizens . . . shall have the same right, in

50

See Southern Poverty Law Center, TERROR IN OUR NEIGHBORHOODS: HATE CRIMES LAW
189 (2006).
51
Sections 242 and 245 of Title 18 are often described in the same breath as § 241 and
section 3631 of the Fair Housing Act. Section 242 is designed to punish anti-integrationist violence
which is committed, “under color of law,”—by law enforcement officials acting in their official
capacity. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948). I have not dealt with it here because in the vast majority of cases,
anti-integrationist violence is committed by one’s neighbors. Section 245, the most specific of the
federal legislation aimed at bias-motivated conduct, was enacted in 1968 in response to violence
directed at Blacks and other civil rights workers. It prohibits the use of “force or threat of force” to
interfere with an individual’s participation in Federal or protected activities because of his or her
“race, color, religion or national origin.” 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1968). Section 245 was enacted
simultaneously with the Fair Housing Act. The sections that would be used to prosecute antiintegrationist violence are almost identical to section 3631 of the Fair Housing Act, described infra
Part III.A.2. Thus, the notes to § 245 indicate that it does not cover actions that could be reached
under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 3601–19, 3631 (1968)).
52
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1948).
53
Id. The relevant text indicates that §241 protects “the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured . . . by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
54
See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 341 U.S. F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 41 U.S.
975 (2004). In Allen, the Court identified a local public park which had been a space for
performances, exhibitions, and other sources of entertainment as a public accommodation for the
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) in order to uphold the conviction of a neo-Nazi group for interfering
with federal rights at the park.
55
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).

56

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 5:47

every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 56
Federal civil rights law under Title 18 is best recognized for its use to
prosecute the Ku Klux Klan or for its use in famous civil rights cases, such as the
1964 murders of civil rights workers Michael Schwerner, James Earl Cheney, and
Andrew Goodman. 57 It has also been used to punish anti-integrationist violence.
For instance, § 241 has been used in many instances to punish those who burned
crosses in attempts to drive Black families from their homes. 58
United States v. Callahan 59 serves as a representative case of the use of § 241
to prosecute anti-integrationist violence. In this case Vincent J. Callahan was
charged under § 241 with having conspired with two others to burn down a house
that had just been vacated by Charles Williams and Marietta Bloxom, a Black
couple, and their daughter. The violence directed at Williams and Bloxom was
part of a concerted effort to drive Blacks from the neighborhood. In midNovember 1985, Williams and Bloxom had moved to Elmwood, a working-class
white neighborhood in Philadelphia. About a week after Williams and Bloxom
moved in, 400 demonstrators gathered outside of their home, shouting racial slurs
and demanding the couple leave. 60 Frightened, the family decided to do just that.
Ironically, they were in the process of moving out when the house was set on fire.
Two and a half weeks after William and Bloxom moved in, Gerald and Carol Fox,
an interracial couple, and their children moved in three blocks from the WilliamsBloxom house. 61 The Foxes were also subjected to racial slurs, epithets,
vandalism, and demonstrations by local residents urging the Foxes to leave. 62
2. The Federal Fair Housing Act
Because of the housing-based context of anti-integrationist move-in violence,
the most common federal remedy is prosecution under § 3631 of the Federal Fair
Housing Act. 63 The Fair Housing Act (FHA), enacted simultaneously with § 245
of Title 18 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, is specifically aimed at
56

Id.
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
58
See, e.g., United States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lee, 6
F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gresser, 935 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Stewart, 806 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315 (7th
Cir. 1983).
59
659 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
60
Fire Set in Philadelphia House Vacated by Blacks, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1985 at 16.
61
George Esper, Racial Protest Splits Urban Neighborhood: Philadelphia Black Couple
Forced to Move, Interracial Pair Plan to Stay Despite Threats, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1985, at 5.
62
Id. See also Callahan, 659 F. Supp. at 80.
63
42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1968).
57
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discriminatory housing practices, including anti-integrationist violence.
It
prohibits interfering on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial
status, or national origin with an individual's right to buy, sell, or rent housing. 64
Section 3631, added to the FHA during debate in the Senate, provides broad
protection designed to cover almost any type of intimidation leveled at individuals
in their homes. This section prohibits an individual acting “by force or threat of
force” from willfully injuring, intimidating or interfering with:
(a) any person because of his race, color, religion, sex, handicap . . . ,
familial status, . . . or national origin and because he is or has been
selling, purchasing, renting, financing, occupying, or contracting or
negotiating for the sale, purchase, rental, financing or occupation of any
dwelling, or applying for or participating in any service, organization, or
facility relating to the business of selling or renting dwellings. 65
Section 3631 has been used to prosecute traditional acts of move-in or antiintegrationist violence such as cross burnings, fire bombings, vandalism, assaults,
and threats occurring in and around victims’ dwellings. 66 Many of the cases
prosecuted under § 3631 fit the typical pattern for move-in violence. In other
words, they involve actions targeted at racial and ethnic minorities—primarily 67
African-Americans, Asian-Americans and Latinos—whose moves to all-white
neighborhoods prompted violent responses. 68
64

42 U.S.C. § 3601–19, 3631 (1968).
42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) (1968).
66
See, e.g., United States v. May, 359 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 2004) (cross burning); United States
v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1977) (arson and vandalism); United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d
454 (9th Cir. 1989) (threats); United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1184 (1986) (assault).
67
Whites can and have been targeted for race-based hate crimes that have been prosecuted
under § 3631. Unlike cases involving Asians, Blacks and Latinos, the majority of cases involving
white victims do not however fit the typical pattern of move-in violence, that is, they are not
situations in which whites are the racial minority and are being driven from the neighborhood for
racial reasons. Situations in which whites are the victim often involve attacks against them by other
whites because of their association with minorities. See, e.g., United States v. May, 359 F.3d 683
(4th Cir. 2004) (cross burned on lawn of white woman who lived with a Black man); United States v.
Sheldon, 107 F.3d 868 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (defendant convicted for burning
a cross on the front lawn of an interracial couple’s house); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241
(7th Cir. 1993) (defendant convicted under § 3631 for burning two crosses on the property of a white
family who had entertained Black friends); United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1989)
(defendant convicted under § 3631 for sending letters aimed at discouraging the white head of an
adoption agency from promoting the placement of Black and Asian adopted children with white
families); United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 US 1184 (1986)
(defendant convicted for breaking into interracial couples’ homes and assaulting them because of
their relationship); United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 United
States 829 (1980) (defendant terrorized members of an interracial couple).
68
See, e.g., United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2001) (cross burning at home
of interracial family); United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 1998) (cross burning in
65
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Though a conviction under § 3631 does not require proof that the defendant
intended to drive the victims out of the neighborhood, 69 in many of the cases
prosecuted under the statute, defendants’ intentions seem clear. For instance, one
rather typical case prosecuted under § 3631, United States v. Redwine, involved the
Williams, a Black family who moved into an all-white neighborhood in Muncie,
Indiana. 70 Immediately upon moving in, they suffered threats that their home
would be burned, as well as rocks and bottles thrown against the house and into the
home. 71 The couple and their four children moved out a month later, after the
house was firebombed. 72 Evidence of defendant Samuel Redwine’s motivation
came from testimony that he had stated on several occasions that the Black family
“shouldn’t be there” and should be “run out.” 73 As in Redwine, in other cases the
defendants’ own statements frequently serve as evidence that they manifested the
requisite racial motivation and intention to interfere with the victim’s rights. 74
As could be expected, incidents of move-in and anti-integrationist violence
have a terrible emotional impact on the families that are targeted. Frequently, after
a cross is burned or there is another incident directed at the family in their homes,
all family members experience significant trauma. 75 In the case of Mattie Harrell,
whose story is mentioned at the beginning of this article, the crime, she later
recounted, “tore the whole family up. We will never be the same.” 76 Harrell said
that she and her husband divorced, in part as a result of the stress caused by the
hate crime. 77
front of trailer of interracial couple because defendant did not want them in his surroundings); United
States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 315 (7th Cir. 1983) (after a Black couple moved into the all-white
neighborhood approximately a block and a half away from defendants’ homes, the defendants
engaged in conduct intended to get the Black couple to move out); United States v. Anzalone, 555
F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1977) (vandalism and arson directed against a Black family that intended to move
into a house).
69
See, e.g., Wood, 780 F.2d at 955 (holding that a defendant’s actions need not be designed to
force the victim to move).
70
715 F.2d 315, 316 (1983).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 23 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1994) (evidence of
defendant’s motivation for burning a cross in front of a shelter for homeless Black veterans included
discussions that the defendant said the home housed “niggers” and that he wanted to burn a cross in
order to scare the Blacks who lived at the shelter); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1241 (7th
Cir. 1993) (evidence of defendant’s motivation for burning a cross in front of the Jones’ house was
that they got it because “niggers” and “coons” were staying with a white family); United States v.
McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1992) (evidence of defendant’s motivation came at least in part
from his shouting, “all niggers must die,” after shots rang out).
75
See, e.g., Laura J. Lederer, The Case of the Cross Burning, An Interview with Russ and
Laura Jones, in THE PRICE WE PAY 27, 28 (1995) (describing anger and fear after the cross burning).
76
Newman, supra note 4.
77
Id.

2007]

HATE THY NEIGHBOR

59

Often, in cases of anti-integrationist violence it is the children who are hit the
hardest. In Mattie Harrell’s case, the shotgun blast directed at her house tore into
the wall near where her eight-year-old son would have been sleeping. 78 Though
her son escaped injury, for several years afterward he had trouble sleeping. 79 In
the case of the Smalls, a Black family living in an isolated all-white rural area in
northwest Florida who had a cross burned on their lawn, their two teenage children
decided to join the military several months after the cross burning, at least in part
80
“to escape the racial bigotry that the cross-burning represented.”
3. Federal Sentence Enhancements
When there are charges at the federal level, Congress has passed two types of
penalty enhancement statutes which have been applied to anti-integrationist
violence. The first hate crimes sentence enhancement was passed as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 81 It allowed the federal
sentencing guidelines to be amended to provide hate crime penalty enhancement.
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3A1.1(a) allows for victim-related adjustment
for any federal offense, even for crimes not prosecuted as hate crimes, that were
committed with bias motivation. 82 This section mandates:
If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property
as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender,
disability, or sexual orientation of any person, increase by 3 levels. 83
The vulnerable victim provision of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines can also be
used in cases of anti-integrationist violence. This provision allows for an increase
of two levels if the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was a
“vulnerable victim.” 84 A vulnerable victim is one who is “unusually vulnerable”
due to a particular susceptibility to criminal conduct. 85 In a move that is not
surprising given the threat that anti-integrationist violence inspires, most of the

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id.
United States v. Long, 935 F.2d 1207, 1211 (11th Cir. 1991).
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (to appear as note to 28 U.S.C. § 994).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2000).
Id. at §3A1.1(a).
Id. at § 3A1.1(b)(1).
Id.
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cases applying the vulnerable victim provision have been cases in which
individuals’ housing rights have been threatened. 86
In United States v. Long, in applying the vulnerable victim sentence
enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit confronted the desperate isolation that victims
of move-in violence face. 87 In Long, Keith Griffin, Robert Money, and Jackie
Long, along with several others, burned a cross on the front lawn of the Smalls’
home in the middle of the night. 88 The Smalls, a Black family, had just moved to
an all-white area of northwestern Florida. 89 As the cross was burning, Robert
Money fired four gunshots to let the family know that the cross was there. 90
Defendants were charged under §§ 241 and 3631. 91 As part of their plea
agreement, the defendants admitted that they had decided to burn a cross in the
Smalls’ yard “because of the family’s race and their presence in the
neighborhood.” 92 The government requested at sentencing that the defendants’
offense levels be enhanced two levels under the vulnerable victim adjustment. 93
Although on appeal the court rejected the government’s argument that the
vulnerable victim adjustment should be applied whenever the victim of a cross
burning is a Black American, the court did find that in this case the enhancement
could be applied. 94 According to the court, use of the enhancement was justified
because the Smalls were the first and only Black family to move into the area, their
home was physically isolated, and the cross was burned in the middle of the
night. 95
Though there are a variety of remedies available to prosecute move-in
violence at the federal level, there are barriers to this particular avenue as well. 96
First, the appropriate Assistant Attorney General must approve prosecution.
Second, all acts of anti-integrationist violence are also state crimes, and thus
Justice Department rules for dual prosecution apply. U.S. Attorneys are precluded
from initiating federal prosecution for substantially the same acts unless: (1) the
matter has involved a substantial federal interest, (2) the prior prosecution did not
vindicate the federal interest, and (3) the admissible evidence probably will be

86
HATE CRIMES LAW, supra note 50, at 189. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 935 F.2d 1207
(11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1989).
87
United States v. Long, 935 F.2d 1207 (1991).
88
Id. at 1209.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1211–12.
95
Id. at 1212.
96
See HATE CRIMES LAW, supra note 50, at 50.
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sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction by an unbiased trier of fact. 97 Finally,
there is the issue of awareness. Low-level hate crimes, particularly those that do
not receive media attention, may not come to the attention of the local U.S.
Attorney’s office.
B. State Remedies
1. State and Local Hate Crime Statutes
In addition to federal penalties under which anti-integrationist bias-motivated
violence may be punished, states and localities around the country have passed
special hate crime legislation criminalizing bias motivated incidents. The dual
sovereignty rule allows incidents to be prosecuted under both state and federal
law. 98 Thus, though most hate crimes may be punished under federal law, most
hate crime prosecutions (like most prosecutions in general) occur at the state,
rather than the federal, level. 99
Nearly all states have some form of hate or bias crime law. 100 There are
several different types of state hate crime statutes. The most common type of state
bias crime statutes are bias-motivated violence and intimidation laws. Biasmotivated violence and intimidation statutes, “ethnic intimidation,” and “malicious
harassment” make the commission of a hate crime a separate offense. 101 In such
cases, if a crime already defined in the state’s criminal code has been committed
with racial animus, or if the defendant has selected the victim based on particular
characteristics—most commonly race, color, religion, and national origin—then
the defendant has committed a hate crime. 102

97

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, 9-2.031 DUAL AND SUCCESSIVE
PROSECUTION
POLICY
(“Petite
Policy”),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.031 (last visited
July 21, 2007).
98
See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 378 (1922). One prominent case of antiintegrationist violence in which state prosecution failed to punish the perpetrators was R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). After the Supreme Court struck the Minnesota statute at issue, the Justice
Department brought charges against one of the perpetrators in United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821,
823 (8th Cir. 1994).
99
LEVIN & MCDEVITT, supra note 8, at 186.
100
Id. at 252.
101
Id. See, e.g., 2000 Conn. Acts 00-72, §§ 1 and 2 (Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
265, § 39 (LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231, subd. 4 (West 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 240.30.3 and 240.31.2 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-401.14(a) (LexisNexis
2005); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.155 and 166.165 (2006).
102
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702.C14 (protecting race, color, religion, national
origin, sexual orientation, gender or disability); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(16) (West 2007)
(protecting race, color, religion, nationality or country of origin); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58
(West 2004) (protecting race, color, religion).
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Other forms of statutes used by several states are penalty enhancement
statutes, and laws that treat bias motivation as an aggravating factor in
sentencing. 103 In states with a special penalty enhancement statute or an
aggravated penalty statute, if a crime has been determined to have been motivated
by bias, the defendant will receive an increased sentence. 104 States may also have
statutes which define hate crimes in ways similar to federal legislation, as civil
rights violations. 105 Finally, in situations in which crosses are burned, perpetrators
have been charged under state cross-burning statutes. 106
Several state remedies addressing bias-motivated violence have come under
constitutional scrutiny. The first of these occurred in 1993 in R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
when the Supreme Court struck down as violative of the First Amendment a St.
Paul hate crime ordinance used to punish a cross burning. 107 The very next year,
in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Court upheld a hate crime penalty enhancement
statute. 108 In doing so, the Court limited the effect of R.A.V. by allowing states to
create statutes aimed at the act of intentional selection of a victim because of his
race.
2. State Criminal Law
As described in Part IIIB supra, anti-integrationist violence commonly
includes cross burning, vandalism, and other property damage, and low-level
assaults. Such incidents are, of course, common law crimes and may be
prosecuted under the state criminal law. There are, unfortunately, two barriers to
the prosecution of these types of crimes under the “ordinary” criminal law. The
first barrier is one of police response and investigation. When they are not
classified as hate crimes but rather as simple assaults and vandalism, hate crimes
103

HATE CRIMES LAW, supra note 50, at 265. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-111(2)
(2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304(a)(2) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085(1) (West 2005);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West 2004).
104
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-13 (2005) (imposing additional penalties for bias-motivated
offenses); MISS. CODE ANN. §99-19-307 (West 2006) (maximum penalty may be twice that
authorized for the underlying offense if committed with bias); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-111 (LexisNexis
2006) (indicating that if bias is found offenses shall be punished by imposition of the next higher
penalty classification); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.185 (LexisNexis 2006) (reclassifying designated
offenses as gross misdemeanors if bias is present).
105
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.76.110 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (West
2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304(a)(1) (2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.5.1 (West 2003); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2931 (West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 37 (West 2003);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (2003).
106
See, e.g., In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Talley, 858
F.2d 217, 226 (Wash. 1993).
107
R.A.V. v. St. Paul., 505 U.S. 377 (1992). For discussion of the background facts in this
case, see Jeannine Bell, O Say, Can You See: Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses, 39
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 335 (2004).
108
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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fall into the category of low-level crimes. 109 Because of their low offense level,
police officers have little desire to investigate. 110 Even cross burnings have been
mischaracterized as malicious mischief, vandalism, or burning without a permit. 111
In some jurisdictions, police have been reluctant to take hate crime victims’
complaints seriously. 112 If police do not file an official police report or investigate,
such crimes are unlikely to be charged. Even if police are shocked or are
committed to investigation, if the crime occurs in the middle of the night without
witnesses, the police may feel powerless to help victims or bring charges. 113
Even if the police decide to investigate and a perpetrator is found, use of the
ordinary criminal law may still present difficulties. The Jones’ case presents an
excellent example of how the criminal law may not accurately address incidents of
move-in violence. In 1990, one night a few months after the Jones moved to a
white working-class neighborhood in St. Paul, a group of skinheads burned a large
cross in their front yard. 114 At four o’clock in the morning, another cross was
burned in front of the apartment building across the street from the Jones’ house. 115
There were no witnesses who saw the cross placed on the Jones’ front lawn.
The perpetrators were discovered when one of them was overheard bragging to his
friends about the cross burning, and the four perpetrators, one of whom was an
adult, and three of whom were juveniles, were charged with various crimes. 116 In
thinking about how best to charge the last juvenile, the prosecutor in the case
evaluated several statutes: trespass, arson, vandalism, and terroristic threats. 117
Trespass, arson, and vandalism were eliminated because some of the elements of
the crime were missing. 118 For instance, the prosecutor indicated that a vandalism
charge would not have worked because there was not destruction of property—not
even a burned spot on the Jones’ grass. 119 The prosecutor decided to charge the
juveniles under Minnesota’s recently passed bias crimes ordinance because the
adult had already pleaded guilty to the hate crimes charged and received
109

JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: CIVIL RIGHTS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND HATE CRIME 36

(2002).
110

Id.
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, supra note 39, at 18.
112
See generally Bell, supra note 107; Elizabeth A. Boyd et al., “Motivated by Hatred or
Prejudice”: Categorization of Hate-Motivated Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 LAW & SOC’Y.
REV. 819, 822 (1996).
113
See, e.g., Lederer, supra note 75 (noting police officers investigating cross burning
indicated that because there were no witnesses, they had no suspects).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Laura J. Lederer, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: An Interview with Tom Foley, in THE PRICE
WE PAY 195 (1995).
119
Id.
111
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probation. 120 One of the defendants, Robert A. Viktora or “R.A.V.,” hired a First
Amendment lawyer and challenged the statute, which was eventually struck down
121
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
3. State Cross Burning Statutes
In cases in which the perpetrator burns a cross, states may use cross burning
statutes as a remedy. State cross burning statutes originated in the 1950s as a
reaction to the use of the burning cross by the Ku Klux Klan. Such statutes may
penalize cross burning in a variety of ways, either as a section of a statute that
criminalizes the use of symbols in an intimidating manner 122 or as part of a statute
that prohibits malicious intimidation. 123 One example of move-in violence
prosecuted under a state cross burning statute is State v. Talley. 124 Talley, along
with two other individuals, was prosecuted for having burned a cross on his own
lawn in the presence of a mixed-race family who had planned to move to his
neighborhood. 125 Talley had complained that “having niggers next-door” would
ruin his property values. 126 He was prosecuted under Washington state’s malicious
harassment statute which specifically punished cross burning. 127
Like other types of hate crime statutes, cross burning statutes have also been
challenged on First Amendment grounds. In fact, such statutes briefly disappeared
as a remedy for anti-integrationist violence. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision in R.A.V., Washington state’s court, and a few other state courts struck
down their cross burning statutes. 128 In 2003, in Virginia v. Black, the Court once
again evaluated the constitutionality of cross burning. 129 In this case, the Court
considered an appeal by the Commonwealth of the Virginia from a decision of the
Virginia Supreme Court striking down Virginia’s cross burning statute. Though
the respondents in the case, Barry Black, Richard Elliot, and Jonathan O’Mara, had
all been convicted under the statute for burning a cross, the circumstances of the
cross burnings were somewhat different. Black had presided over the burning of a
120

Id.
In R.A.V. v. St. Paul, supra note 107, the Supreme Court struck down the city of St. Paul’s
bias crime ordinance on First Amendment grounds, finding it impermissible content-based regulation.
122
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11411 (2007); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3312.02 (2001); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1456 (1989).
123
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7903 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §45-5-221 (2003).
124
State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993).
125
Id. at 220.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993) (striking down Maryland’s cross burning
statute); State v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349, 354–55 (N.J. 1994) (striking down New Jersey’s cross
burning statute).
129
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
121
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cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally. 130 O’Mara and Elliot were convicted for having
burned a cross on the lawn of the Black neighbor who had recently moved to the
neighborhood. 131
In its decision in Black, the Supreme Court found Virginia’s statute
unconstitutional not because it criminalized cross burning per se, but rather
because, under the Virginia statute, the act of burning a cross was prima facie
evidence of the intent to intimidate. 132 In other words, the Court allowed states to
outlaw cross burning performed with intent to intimidate. Though state cross
burning statutes that criminalize cross burnings undertaken with intent to
intimidate were upheld, after Black states may not make the fact that a cross was
burned prima facie evidence that this requirement has been met. In other words,
there must be an independent determination based on the facts in the case
indicating whether in burning a cross the defendant manifested an intention to
intimidate.
Cases in which a cross is burned on the front lawn of the only Black family in
an all-white neighborhood, especially when it is done soon after they have moved
in, are situations in which the intent of the perpetrators seems very clear.
Nevertheless, after Black, the Court’s requiring evidence of intent to intimidate
may hamper the state’s ability to successfully prosecute this type of move-in
violence. For instance, a number of cross-burning cases involve joking and/or
drunken perpetrators who, after the fact, may insist that they never intended to
cause harm. 133 Even if the cross burner is drunk or the cross has been burned as a
joke or prank, in cases in which it has been burned on the lawn of the only Black
family in the area, it may nevertheless send a clear message—that the family
should leave the neighborhood. It is not clear whether Black would allow
prosecution of the cross burner in such a case.
The wide variety of remedies for anti-integrationist violence includes both
state and federal prosecution in many different forms—from hate crime and civil
rights law to fair housing legislation. Despite the wide variety of federal remedies,
130

Id.
Id.
132
Id.
133
See, e.g., Garrison v. Conklin, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 337 (2003) (cross burning alleged
as part of a Halloween prank); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Browning, 598 F. Supp. 421 (D. Or. 1983) (cross
burner alleged action was “prank.”); Police Officers for Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 644 F.
Supp. 393 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (wearing of white sheets and burning of cross as a “joke”); United States
v. Hooper, 4 M.J. 830 (1978) (cross burners approach cross burned on military base as joke); In re
Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644 (1st Dist. 1994) (cross burned as a Friday the 13th joke); Neil Lewis,
A Judge, a Renomination and the Cross Burning Case that Won’t End, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at
A16 (describing drunken cross burner); People v. Carr, 81 Cal. App. 4th 837 (4th Dist. 2000) (cross
burner was intoxicated); United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2001) (cross burner
drank heavily and took prescription pain medication); United States v. Montgomery, 23 F.3d 1130
(7th Cir. 1994) (cross burner consumed alcohol prior to cross burning); United States. v. Hayward, 6
F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993) (alcohol consumed prior); United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1300
(10th Cir. 2000) (cross burners “drinking heavily” prior to cross burning).
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such violence remains largely unaddressed. In federal cases, the responsibility for
prosecuting hate crimes falls to the Justice Department, whose interest in bringing
cases, commentators note, can vary with the politics of the administration. 134 For
instance, a study by the Southern Poverty Law Center revealed that between 1987
and 1989, the Justice Department initiated prosecution in just thirty-one cases
involving racial violence. 135 Though the precise numbers of actual hate crimes
between 1987 and 1989 is unknown, in 1990 Congress passed the Hate Crime
Statistics Act, mandating that the FBI collect data on hate crimes. FBI statistics on
hate crime in 1991, the first year in which the agency collected data, reported
roughly 3,000 anti-racist hate crimes had occurred. 136 If the number of actual hate
crimes in the late eighties was anywhere near the number reported to the FBI in
1991, the Justice Department may be missing many opportunities to prosecute hate
crimes.
In most hate crime cases, prosecution falls generally to the states, where there
may also be difficulties. Though most states do have some sort of legislation,
there are frequently problems with enforcement. For instance, victims in these
types of cases do not know of the legal landscape. It therefore falls to police and
prosecutors to find and then investigate these cases. The low visibility of many of
the acts that comprise this type of violence means that it may be difficult for such
crimes to be recognized by either state or federal authorities. The larger impact of
anti-integrationist violence on the diversity of neighborhoods is considered in the
next section.
IV. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ANTI-INTEGRATIONIST VIOLENCE ON HOUSING
SEGREGATION
The number of incidents of move-in violence is partly affected by the fact that
there are so many potential spaces for anti-integrationist violence. Almost by
definition, move-in violence is a byproduct of U.S. housing segregation—without
segregated white neighborhoods there would not be move-in violence. In fact,
housing segregation by race is a problem of great magnitude in the United States.
The growing racial diversity of the United States has not been matched by an
increase in diversity within neighborhoods. 137 The problem of segregation is
particularly severe in the case of African-Americans in comparison to whites.
Though Black-white segregation declined during the 1980s, the majority of Blacks
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LEVIN & MCDEVITT, supra note 8, at 182.
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U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, Hate Crime Bias Motivations, 1991.
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THE LEWIS MUMFORD CENTER, ETHNIC DIVERSITY GROWS, NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION
LAGS BEHIND (2001), http://mumford.albany.edu/census/WholePop/WPreport/page1.html; John
Iceland, Beyond Black and White: Metropolitan Residential Segregation in Multi-ethnic America, 33
SOC. SCI. RES. 248, 248–71 (2004).
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continue to live in locations starkly isolated from those of other races. 138 The
results from the 2000 U.S. Census reveal that Blacks were hypersegregated 139 —a
term housing scholars use to define the most extreme form of segregation—in 28
of the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. 140 Though social
scientists studying the problem of segregation cannot agree on the precise origin or
causes of racial segregation in the United States, they have attributed the problem
to three main causes: 1) economics; 2) discrimination; and 3) the preferences of
African-Americans and whites. 141
A. Economics
Economic explanations locate the roots of residential segregation in marketbased differences in the socioeconomic status of Blacks and whites. The absence
of Blacks and other minorities in white neighborhoods is attributed to the fact that
on average they are located in lower-status occupations and have less wealth and
income than whites. 142 In other words, Blacks and Hispanics do not live in white
neighborhoods because they are unable to afford it. Conversely, whites do not live
in Black or non-white neighborhoods because they are able to afford to live in
white neighborhoods, which have less crime and better social services.
One of the failures of the purely economic explanation is that it is unable to
explain the fact that middle-class Blacks more frequently live in poorer
neighborhoods, with more crime and fewer social services, than whites of a similar
economic status.
Purely economic explanations cannot account for this
phenomenon since this model would predict that, if no barriers to entry exist,
Blacks and whites of the same economic status would live in the same
neighborhoods. Recently, especially given the experiences of middle-class Blacks,
scholars have questioned the adequacy of pure economics to explain the roots of
segregation. 143
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B. Discrimination
To say that discrimination causes segregation is to suggest that the current
distribution of African-Americans in any area can be attributed to legal and
extralegal “steering” practices by realtors, mortgage lenders, sellers, and landlords
aimed at steering minorities away from white areas. 144 Neighbors’ extralegal acts
aimed at integrating residents also fall into this category. Such behavior has been
recognized by scholars as having occurred in many areas of the country, from the
1950s back to the beginnings of non-white integration of white neighborhoods in
the early twentieth century. 145 Whether discrimination has served as a barrier to
integrating minorities since the passage of civil rights laws is contested by scholars
who may contend that the very existence of antidiscrimination law means that
discrimination cannot exist at levels that prevent integration. 146
Despite the legal remedies addressing discrimination, significant evidence
suggests that formal and informal discriminatory practices by whites do serve as
barriers to entry for African-Americans and other non-whites wishing to move to
white neighborhoods. 147 One recent study revealed that though discrimination
against minorities has declined, it still constitutes a significant factor limiting nonwhites’ housing choices. This study, conducted by the Urban Institute for the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), involved sending out
4,600 paired testers to buy or rent property in 23 metropolitan areas. The study
revealed the consistent adverse treatment of Blacks and Hispanics; whites were
more likely to receive information indicating that housing was available. 148 Other
research has similarly uncovered racial discrimination in mortgage lending. 149
With respect to the segregation of public housing, legal scholars and courts have
placed the blame squarely on discriminatory actions by HUD, which administers
federal public housing. 150
144
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There has been little examination of the effectiveness of legal remedies aimed
at eradicating housing discrimination—how the Fair Housing Act works on the
ground. What has been written suggests that the Fair Housing Act has not been
especially effective at eliminating housing discrimination. 151 Some attribute the
failure of the Fair Housing Act enforcement mechanisms to HUD, specifically
noting the paucity of cases brought by the agency. 152 Others argue that the
effectiveness of the Act was blunted by the refusal of Congress to include
153
measures in the original Act that would properly insure its enforcement.
C. Preferences
The literature on preferences attempts to explain racial and ethnic segregation
by suggesting that residential mobility reflects the expressed preferences for samerace neighbors. 154 In other words, Blacks and whites remain segregated because
each group prefers to live in neighborhoods where their own race dominates.
Research in this vein attempts to gauge residents’ preferences by using surveys to
assess Black and white racial attitudes and then extrapolate them to their tolerance
for neighbors of a different race. The questions asked frequently examine issues
such as the respondent’s views of affirmative-action and his or her perceptions of
the racial composition of neighborhoods that might be attractive. 155 Extrapolation
from these attitudes may be misleading, however, because white avoidance of
neighborhoods with greater than a token number of Blacks may stem not just from
racism, but from the fact that they attribute to such places negative
characteristics—high crime rates, declining property values, and poor schools. 156
Recent developments in the preference-based literature raise important issues
for further research. For instance, much of the preference literature reveals that
while whites prefer neighborhoods that contain no more than a small number of
151
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African-Americans, the majority of African-Americans tend to prefer
neighborhoods that contain half whites and half minorities. 157 Other research
suggests that African-Americans dislike neighborhoods in which fewer than ten
percent of the residents are Black. 158 Given more scrutiny, Black preferences
indicate that African-Americans do not desire racial solidarity but rather reflect the
fear that they would face hostility were they to move to predominately white
neighborhoods. 159
In other words, some African-Americans reject white
neighborhoods because they worry that their new neighbors will be prejudiced
against them. 160
D. Neighborhood Preferences and Move-in Violence
Of course segregation provides the context—white neighborhoods—but
segregation alone does not necessarily lead to anti-integrationist behavior. The
literature on preferences combined with the little we know about the roots of
move-in violence provides, at the very least a partial explanation of the sentiments
that spawn violent behavior directed at integrating minorities. Despite increasing
tolerance, public opinion data reveals some degree of white hostility toward
African-Americans. 161
Researchers have identified the most recent versions of white hostility as a
new form of subtle prejudice, “racial resentment.” 162 Though distinct from both
racial prejudice and biological racism, racial resentment captures strong racially
unsympathetic sentiments and predicts derogatory stereotypes. 163 This means, for
example, that animosity toward Blacks is expressed in language that depicts Blacks
as unwilling to try and as taking what they have not earned and therefore do not
deserve. 164
Other research has demonstrated how racial resentment plays out in the
housing context. One of the most comprehensive pieces of ethnographic research
on neighborhood integration was conducted in Chicago in the mid-1990s. In
157
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“There Goes the Neighborhood,” William Julius Wilson and Richard Taub
describe the result of in-depth interviews with residents of the “Beltway,” a
predominately white, largely working-class Chicago neighborhood. 165 Because it
was still in the city, and city workers were required to live within the city limits,
the neighborhood attracted large numbers of police officers and firefighters. In
addition to its reputation as a working-class, “cops and firefighters” neighborhood,
the Beltway is described as a relatively close-knit community with a high degree of
stability. 166
Though it had a reputation for high stability, in the decade between 1990 and
2000, the Beltway began to experience significant racial change as Blacks and
Latinos moved into a neighborhood that had been 95% white in 1980. 167 The
white population declined slightly, but most of the demographic change was
caused by a large increase in the Latino population, which grew 21% between
1990 and 2000. 168 A tiny increase in the Black population, from a handful to 300
residents, though less than 1% of the population, was described as “symbolic.” 169
Members of the community may have considered the increase in the Black
population in their neighborhood significant because they connected it to
advantages they felt Blacks had been able to extract from city officials. Some
residents clearly believed that Black gains were at the expense of whites. One
respondent told interviewers:
They’re talking about bringing contractors to do our jobs. . . . This
whole city is going down the fucking toilet. . . . If [Mayor Daley’s] dad
knew what he was doing he would turn in his grave. Now old man
Daley, he was for the blue-collar worker. Used to be that when you had
those jobs you had ‘em for life and you could raise a family. It’s all
different now, taxes and all that shit is killing the workingman. We’re
paying to support all the niggers and minorities . . . [i]t’s all fucked up
and I’ll tell ya why: too many niggers an’ Mexicans an’ minorities in this
city. 170
Another reason that racial change may have felt so destabilizing was that
whites in Beltway may have seen the neighborhood as somewhat of a refuge,
located near the edge of the city and in one of the last affordable, predominately
white neighborhoods. Beltway residents described themselves as having been
165
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON & RICHARD P. TAUB, THERE GOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIAL,
ETHNIC AND CLASS TENSIONS IN FOUR CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS AND THEIR MEANING FOR AMERICA
(2006).
166
Id. at 17.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 23–24.

72

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

driven out of other neighborhoods by minorities.
resident described it:

[Vol 5:47

As one longtime Beltway

What you have to understand is that for many people they had to move
once or twice . . . . When Martin Luther King marched on Chicago, he
went to places like Marquette Park and so on. People in places like Gage
Park, you know . . . just left. So, many people who live here had to move
171
once, twice.
The arrival of people of color to the Beltway neighborhood was not just
disliked, but also feared. White neighborhood residents worried that housing
integration would increase crime in the neighborhood, increase poverty, cause a
decrease in property values, and lead to the worsening of schools. In general,
integration would lead to the decline of the entire neighborhood. 172
Ethnographic research reveals that Beltway residents’ desire to live in
neighborhoods where minorities were absent is shared with residents living in allwhite neighborhoods in other cities. 173 For instance, one study of white
neighborhood youths from the Bensonhurst and Gravesend neighborhoods in
Brooklyn, similarly close-knit, mostly white communities, revealed the youths had
much in common with white Beltway residents. The youths felt under siege from
minorities. The election of a Black mayor, David Dinkins, was viewed as leading
to Blacks taking over the city. “You know, Italians used to run the city. We didn’t
have any problems ‘cause we had political juice [power]. Now the Blacks have
taken over, and we don’t get nothin’ from the politicians.” 174
The belief that Blacks cause crime was another view shared by Brooklyn
youth and Beltway residents. Though they chose to deal with it differently, the
Brooklyn youth viewed the neighborhood as their turf, considering it as their
collective obligation to defend their territory against Blacks. 175 They also
suggested that these views were commonly held in their neighborhood. As one
youth told the researcher, “If a white guy walks my block, nobody will say
anything to him. But if the Black guy walked onto my block everybody puts their
head out the window to make sure he leaves the block.” 176
The precise relationship between desiring neighborhoods in which there are
few people of color and committing crimes against them when they move in is
unclear. The literature on move-in violence and segregation does, however,
suggest that some whites who are fiercely protective of their neighborhood spaces
171
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173
174
175
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will engage in acts of violence to discourage minority incursions. This may be
more likely to happen in cases in which the neighborhood is close-knit or has a
particular ethnic identity that residents feel fiercely driven to protect.
At this point researchers have not identified the precise causes of housing
segregation that create a context for move-in violence. Explanations that place the
blame on economics fail to account for the experiences of middle-class Blacks who
tend to live in neighborhoods that are less diverse than their racial tolerance scores
might suggest and are poorer than they can afford. Discrimination-based
explanations fail to account for the presence of civil rights law and moreover have
been unable to provide evidence of the level of discrimination that would be
required to cause such a high degree of segregation.
The key to explaining such a high level of segregation may lie in the
following preference-based explanations. As we know, many whites are not
willing to live in diverse neighborhoods because they fear crime, poverty and a
lack of social services associated with such spaces. Minorities, particularly
African-Americans, on the other hand, are less willing to live in white
neighborhoods because they fear white hostility and the violence associated with it.
The move-in violence literature suggests that this may be a realistic fear indeed.
In order to craft the appropriate legal responses to any discrimination or
violence that serves as a barrier to non-white in-migration, we must improve our
understanding of the factors that shape behavior in this context. Though there is a
history of anti-integrationist violence and there are experiences that continue to the
present day, much of minority integration of white neighborhoods is peaceful.
Thus, at this point we do not know specifically when or what causes low-level
white hostility to escalate into violence. The existing research is similarly unable
to tell whether white attitudes seeming to reject neighborhoods in which more than
a token of minorities live translates into hostility toward new non-white neighbors.
Further research is needed on the nature and extent of white hostility toward
African-Americans and other minorities who move into white neighborhoods and
ultimately the effect of this hostility on segregation.
V. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF MOVE-IN VIOLENCE
The problem of move-in violence is complex. Addressing the problems faced
by minority families who attempt to move to white neighborhoods and find crimes
committed against them requires a solution on two fronts—legislation to punish
perpetrators and enforcement of existing remedies. Until there is movement on
both of those fronts, move-in violence and other acts of anti-integrationist terror
are likely to continue.
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A. The Legislative Challenge—Separate Bias Crime Statutes
Though federal remedies exist, for a variety of reasons most hate crimes are
prosecuted at the state level. In order to successfully prosecute individuals for
move-in violence, states must have statutes specifically aimed at bias-motivated
crime. The use of the ordinary criminal law will not motivate police officers to
treat hate crimes as important. Because acts of move-in violence are generally
low-level crimes, such incidents simply will not be investigated, and therefore
cannot be prosecuted.
The creation of separate statutes to punish bias-motivated crime has been, and
remains controversial. Hate crime legislation has been fiercely attacked by critics,
who have leveled doctrinal, practical, empirical and purely philosophical critiques
at hate crime legislation. The largest category of objections to hate crime
legislation is purely doctrinal, contending that hate crime legislation is not justified
because it punishes thought and in doing so violates the First Amendment. 177
From the perspective of such critics, when evidence of motivation for the crime
comes from words—slurs or epithets used during the crime—the defendant is
being punished for his racist beliefs, which are protected by the First Amendment.
Related to this argument is a practical one. Some critics argue that hate crime
legislation is flawed because the motivation in hate crime cases is impossible to
discern. 178 Because motivation is so complex, and because so many individuals
may have mixed motivations, you just cannot tell precisely why someone
committed a crime. 179 Thus, the argument goes, they should not be held
accountable for having committed a bias crime. Sometimes these arguments are
predicated on psychological theory. 180
Closely related to these practical concerns regarding locating the perpetrators’
motivation are empirical ones regarding the ability of law enforcement officers to
identify bias. Some critics have argued that police officers are unable to separate
hate crime, which the state may regulate, from constitutionally protected hate
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speech. 181 In other words, the worry is that the use of a slur can get one arrested
for a hate crime.
Supporters of hate crime legislation have countered these arguments in a
variety of ways. The doctrinal issues have largely been settled by the Supreme
Court, which has upheld hate crime legislation, ruling in Wisconsin v. Mitchell that
in punishing bias motivation, rather than hate speech, hate crime statutes were
similar to other statutes in the criminal law and do not violate the First
Amendment. 182 Those in favor of bias crime legislation have pointed out that
additional penalties for bias-motivated violence have been justified by the
increased level of harm caused by such crimes. 183
The existence of move-in violence and its prevalence provides an additional
justification for current legislation. As this article has suggested, even in the
current climate of racial tolerance, crimes directed at minorities who have moved
to white neighborhoods remain a severe problem. When it occurs, such violence
may come in the form of small acts of neighborhood terrorism—vandalism to cars,
broken windows and other property damage, harassment and intimidation.
Families at whom such crimes are directed may be isolated, as newcomers, and as
the only persons of color in the neighborhood. Even if they do turn to law
enforcement officers for help, the police may be reluctant to investigate such lowlevel crimes, especially when the victim is not able to identify the perpetrator.

181

See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND
IDENTITY POLITICS 92–100 (1998); Gellman, supra note 177, at 364–65; Gerstenfeld, supra note 178;
but cf. Jeannine Bell, Deciding When Hate Is a Crime: First Amendment Police Detectives, and the
Identification of a Crime, 4 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 33, 62–71 (2002) (arguing that police officers
are able to separate constitutionally protected hate speech from unprotected evidence motivation for
hate crime).
182
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485–86 (1993).
183
See, e.g., FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW
(Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (arguing that hate crimes cause greater harm to victims and hate crimes
legislation sends an important symbolic message); Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist
Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes Legislation are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739 (1999)
(recognizing the greater harm of bias-motivated violence); Jason A. Abel, Americans under Attack:
The Need for Federal Hate Crimes Legislation in Light of Post-September 11 Attacks on ArabAmericans and Muslims, 12 ASIAN L.J. 41 (2005) (arguing that hate crimes cause greater harm than
other crimes); Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What’s Wrong with Harmless Theories of
Punishment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1215 (2004) (using a retributivist and constructivist approach to
argue that hate crimes cause greater harm); Allison Marston Danner, Bias Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity: Culpability in Context, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389 (2002) (positing that the defendant’s
action must be viewed in a social context and the defendant should be punished for contributing to
discrimination); Dhammika Dharmapala, Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic
Analysis, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 185 (2004) (using economic analysis to show that hate crimes lead
to greater social harm); Troy A. Scotting, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger Federal
Legislation, 34 AKRON L. REV. 853 (2001) (stating that hate crimes impact not only the victim but
also a broader community); Megan Sullaway, Psychological Perspectives on Hate Crime Laws, 10
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250 (2004) (arguing that hate crimes cause greater harm than other crimes
and that critics’ use of psychology is inappropriate).

76

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 5:47

Without recourse, the violence is likely to continue, and the victim is likely to
leave the neighborhood.
Hate crime legislation provides one of the most effective remedies for states
wishing to address bias-motivated violence that occurs upon moving to a
neighborhood. For a variety of reasons, the use of hate crime legislation in the
neighborhood context is especially justified. In the context of anti-integrationist
and move-in violence, the perpetrators’ motive is crystal clear—he or she wants
the people of color to move out because he or she wants the neighborhood to
remain white.
B. The Enforcement Issue
Part of the reason that specialized hate crime statutes are superior to the
ordinary criminal law is that many of the statutes have motive requirements and
require police officers to gather evidence of what motivated the crime. This is not
a typical function for police officers, and thus, many police departments have
created specialized units for bias crime. 184 Such units have the function not only
of gathering evidence of motivation so that perpetrators may be charged, but also
the task of finding perpetrators—something that is notoriously difficult, since
victims and perpetrators generally do not know each other. 185 These units may
spread publicity about the existence of bias crime legislation, so the victims may
have greater awareness that such behavior is illegal. Finally, specialized hate
crime units may also work at preventing move-in violence from occurring by
conducting proactive patrols of neighborhoods to which minorities are moving. 186
Of course, the existence of hate crime legislation in and of itself will not
necessarily address anti-integrationist violence. It is crucial that legislation be
enforced, and while the legislation creates an incentive for police departments to
create bias crime units, this does not mean that in every jurisdiction that has a bias
crime statute, such legislation will be enforced. Any specialized police bias crime
unit must be supported by a prosecutor’s office that is committed to bringing
charges in cases where conviction is not assured. The local court system must also
support the prosecution of anti-integrationist violence. If judges see the
harassment of minorities moving to white neighborhoods as “free speech,” or
legitimate behavior on the part of individuals who want to control their turf, then
few defendants will be convicted of hate crimes. In order for bias-motivated
violence to effectively be addressed by hate crime statutes, each of these forces—
184
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police, prosecutors, and judges—must be committed to taking seriously charges of
bias-motivated violence.
The stakes of not correcting problems with legislation or enforcement may be
quite high. If hate crimes are providing such a disincentive that minorities are
reluctant to choose neighborhoods they might otherwise, it is imperative that we
make corrections that will allow states to fully address neighborhood hate crimes.
Beyond the issue of fully protecting individuals’ housing rights and allowing them
to move to neighborhoods where there may be less crime, there is the effect of
move-in violence on housing segregation. Refusing to effectively harness the
power of the State may lead to the continued re-segregation of this country, where
whites and minorities increasingly occupy entirely separate neighborhood spaces.

